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Leading communication scholars have recently called for questions of meaning and 
ideology to be brought back into comparative media research. This article heeds that call 
by delineating a discourse approach to the comparative study of media and politics. This 
discourse approach is introduced with reference to a formerly influential but recently 
stigmatized strand of research in the tradition of Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, 
Peterson, and Schramm (1956/1973), although it abandons and goes well beyond this 
work. To illustrate the benefits of such an approach, a case study of the media-politics 
discourse dominant in Russia in 2012–2013 is presented. The findings are then 
marshalled to unravel three seemingly paradoxical observations about the Russian 
media landscape. 
 




This essay has been prompted, in part, by a flurry of seemingly paradoxical observations made 
over the past decade during my research into Russia’s semiauthoritarian media landscape. A first 
observation that typically surprises foreign experts is that the Kremlin owns the country’s most influential 
opposition radio station. Among Echo Moscow’s journalists are the fiercest castigators of the Kremlin, 
many of whom have been adorned with international honors. Yulia Latynina, for instance, has been 
awarded the Freedom Defenders Award by the U.S. Department of State (2008). Yet Echo Moscow is 
largely owned by the state-owned gas monopolist Gazprom. The Kremlin could thus easily—by drawing on 
property rights—replace key editorial figures at the recalcitrant radio station. But it has been hesitant to 
interfere too bluntly with Echo Moscow’s journalistic content, even in the tense political climate that 
followed the 2013 Euromaidan protests in Kiev. 
 
Similarly, one of the country’s most influential blogging platforms, LiveJournal, is owned by the 
company Rambler-Afisha-SUP, a holding deeply penetrated by Kremlin-friendly capital (Kholding “Afisha-
Rambler-SUP,” 2014). Nonetheless, the blogs of leading opposition figures have continued to operate on 
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this platform (Toepfl, 2012). Third, not only the media policies of Russia’s ruling elites but also the media 
practices of ordinary citizens are difficult to make sense of within standard Western frameworks of 
thinking (see also Roudakova, 2009). For instance, in a survey, only 17% of Russian citizens said they 
believed that TV provided them with a “full and objective picture of events” (Levada Tsentr, 2010). 
However, 87% continued to use TV as their main source of news, and 71% stated that, among news 
sources of all types, they “trusted” TV the most (Fond Obshchestvennoye Mneniye, 2010). How can 
Russians trust their TV channels when they are fully aware that these do not provide a full and objective 
picture of events? 
 
It was observations such as these that I found difficult to make sense of within the current 
mainstream theoretical frameworks of international communication research. I realized that, in order to 
explain these media-related policies and practices, I inevitably had to take into account how the 
participants in my research assigned meaning to the ways they interacted with their media. I needed to 
become familiar with the terms and concepts they used to talk and think about these practices. 
Approaching this type of question in in-depth interviews, I discovered that key concepts of Western media 
politics such as press freedom, media independence, and the free market of ideas were either not 
understood at all, understood differently, or derided by the participants in my research (Toepfl, 2013, 
2014). 
 
In parallel to these observations, I noted an increasing number of other communication scholars 
lamenting a lack of attention to questions of meaning and ideology in recent comparative media research 
(Meng & Rantanen, 2015; Voltmer, 2012; Zhao, 2012). Zhao (2012), for instance, criticizes one of the 
currently dominant theoretical frameworks in the field—Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Three Models of Media 
and Politics—for its “explicit effort to move beyond [Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s (1956/1973)] Four 
Theories’ preoccupation with ‘philosophies’ or ‘ideologies’” (Zhao, 2012, p. 147). This, Zhao claimed, gave 
the seminal book an “‘end of ideology’ feeling” (p. 147). Yet, in Zhao’s (2012) view, history and ideology 
had recently returned “in a horrific form” in the “war against terror” and in a “clash of fundamentalisms” 
(p. 147). In addition, Zhao pointed to the fact that many contemporary communist states, such as 
Vietnam, Laos, and China, continued to officially claim allegiance to socialism. While one might object that 
these claims were hollow and put forward by small circles of political elites, they nonetheless reached out 
to a population larger than that of the 18 Western countries analyzed by Hallin and Mancini. Thus, Zhao 
(2012) concluded that ideological struggles over “universals” and “truth regimes” in the world’s media 
systems were bound to continue, and that it was “necessary to acknowledge these struggles as we 
compare the world’s different media systems” (p. 147). 
 
The theoretical argument put forward in this article is an attempt to heed these recent calls to 
bring back questions of meaning to comparative media research. To do so, I delineate a discourse 
approach to the study of the media and politics. I introduce this approach partly with reference to a 
formerly highly influential strand of research in the tradition of the classic Four Theories of the Press by 
Siebert et al. (1956/1973). This research has been marginalized over the past two decades, following a 
series of devastating criticisms beginning in the mid-1990s. One key argument of this article is, however, 
that, by heavily stigmatizing this tradition, researchers have thrown out the baby with the bathwater. A 
consequence of this was the virtual abandonment of efforts aimed at systematic comparisons of distinct 
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worldviews or meaning systems as these underpin media landscapes around the world (Zhao, 2012). Yet, 
particularly in times when political scientists are observing a global “authoritarian resurgence” and a 
“world movement against democracy” (Walker, 2015, p. 21), knowledge of this type appears vital for an 
in-depth understanding of the media-related practices of citizens, journalists, and political elites across the 
globe. 
 
The key innovation that this article proposes is simple. In the Four Theories tradition, different 
types of relations between the press and politics have typically been discussed as “models,” “theories,” or 
“philosophies.” I suggest, by contrast, moving forward by comparing “discourses” on the media and 
politics. Doing so implies a subtle, yet highly consequential, change of theoretical perspective. At the most 
abstract level, this approach relocates research in the style of the Four Theories tradition within the highly 
elaborate epistemological frameworks of contemporary macro approaches to discourse. One easily 
accessible definition from such an approach understands discourses as a “shared way of apprehending the 
world” (Dryzek, 2013, p. 9). 
 
Adopting a discourse perspective has at least three crucial consequences. First, whereas theories 
or philosophies of the press have typically been understood as timeless constructs (Christians, Glasser, & 
McQuail, 2009; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Nerone, 1995), discourses are usually investigated as they 
prevail—and are appropriated, contested, or resisted—within distinct groups or social spaces and at 
different points in time. This difference also implies a shift in method. Whereas works in the tradition of 
the Four Theories have largely been based on the interpretation of texts of classical philosophers, 
discourse research can rely on an analysis of everyday talk, media content, or data produced in in-depth 
interviews, focus groups, or ethnographies. A third key difference is that research within the Four Theories 
paradigm started from the epistemological premise that every “real” media landscape could be matched 
(more or less accurately) with one single theory, according to which it “actually” operated (see, e.g., de 
Smaele, 1999; Oates, 2007). By contrast, a discourse approach is rooted in the explicit epistemological 
assumption that any media landscape will appear in different terms in different discourses. 
 
To flesh out this discourse approach, the remainder of the article is structured as follows. The 
next section details the basic features of a macro approach to discourse such as I suggest adopting. Then, 
I present an illustrative case study that sketches the dominant media-politics discourse in Russia as 
disseminated by the country’s leading state-controlled TV channel at the turn of 2012/2013. In a 
subsequent discussion section, I marshal the findings to illustrate the relevance of discourse research by 
resolving the three paradoxes mentioned above. To conclude, I point out four promising avenues for 
future research. 
 
A Discourse Approach: Key Epistemological Premises 
 
Over the past three decades, within the discipline of communications, two widely practiced types 
of discourse analysis can be broadly distinguished (Phelan & Dahlberg, 2011). The first type has strong 
roots in the discipline of linguistics and focuses “primarily on the analysis of linguistic and semiotic detail” 
(Phelan & Dahlberg, 2011, p. 8). Approaches to discourse of this first type include the “critical discourse 
analysis” developed by Norman Fairclough or the “discourse-historical approach” suggested by Ruth 
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Wodak (for an overview of this first tradition, consider Gee & Handford, 2012). The second type of 
approach assumes a “more expansive focus on ‘the social’ as a horizon of discourse” (Phelan & Dahlberg, 
2011, p. 8). This second type has strong roots in sociology, critical political theory, and cultural studies. 
Widely cited proponents include Michel Foucault (1971), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), John 
Dryzek (2013), and Stuart Hall (1973). Dryzek (2013), for instance, presented an easily accessible 
discourse analysis of this latter type in his lucidly argued The Politics of the Earth. In this monograph, he 
laid out the “basic structures” of four environmental discourses as these could be identified around the 
globe in the past 50 years, presenting “their history, conflicts, and transformations” (Dryzek, 2013, p. 11). 
 
It is explicitly this second type of macro approach to discourse that I draw upon for this article. 
Within this type of approach, however, key epistemological premises of different proponents still differ in 
important respects. Disparities can be identified in at least three key points concerning the 
conceptualization of (1) the distinction between discursive and nondiscursive practices, (2) the link 
between discourses and the material world, and (3) the relations between humans and discourses. For the 
purposes of this article, I propose to understand discourse—broadly in line with poststructuralist discourse 
theory (e.g., Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Torfing, 2005)—“as a contingent and partial fixation of meaning that 
constitutes and organizes social relations (including identities, objects, and practices)” (Phelan & 
Dahlberg, 2011, p. 861). Grounded in this definition, I position my approach in relation to the three key 
epistemological choices listed above as follows. 
 
First, in sharp contrast to common usage of the term discourse, I suggest understanding 
discourse as not simply a synonym for language but including nonlinguistic social practices that convey 
meaning. Following Foucault (1971) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), I thus see discursive practices as 
inextricably linked to social practices. I assume that linguistic and material practices cannot be neatly 
ontologically separated (Torfing, 2005). Second, concerning the assumed link between discourse and the 
material world, my definition posits that all meaning is “contingent”—that is, that meaning emerges not 
from an essence embedded in the material object as such but only in a relational account between 
different elements within a discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan & Dahlberg, 2011). This by no 
means implies that material reality does not exist. Yet, while reality exists, it does not determine the 
vocabulary that observers will adopt in order to interpret it. In some cases when two observers are not 
operating within the same vocabulary or discourse, they may not be able to agree on the truth of a 
specific claim. As Torfing (2005) put it in a nutshell, discourse theory posits that, “while the world exists 
out there, truth does not” (p. 11). With a view to a discourse approach to the media and politics, this 
premise has one key consequence: In sharp contrast to the Four Theories tradition, empirical research 
within a discourse paradigm will build upon the explicit premise that any media landscape can appear in 
different—yet potentially equally true—terms in different discourses. 
 
This abstract thought can be illustrated with a pertinent example. One of the main criticisms that 
Nerone (1995) leveled against the Four Theories was that their authors considered the U.S. media system 
“libertarian,” whereas it was actually “capitalistic.” Nerone argued that the latter was “true ipso facto,” 
since the majority of U.S. media outlets were “owned and directed by capital” (Nerone, 1995, p. 29). 
Consequently, the U.S. media system was capitalistic. Libertarian scholars, of course, fiercely objected. 
Within a discourse paradigm, the dispute over which of these two claims is true dissolves: The U.S. media 
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system of the 1950s can simultaneously appear as libertarian (in mainstream U.S. discourse) and 
capitalist (in a counterdiscourse circulating among leftist U.S. intellectuals). Within a discourse paradigm, 
these two terms thus do not emerge as inherently contradictory claims to truth but as empirical findings. 
Consequently, although the Four Theories contained only one chapter describing the U.S. media landscape 
as broadly following the libertarian theory, a similar monograph written within a discourse paradigm could 
contain a number of chapters on the U.S. media landscape, reconstructing how it appears within various 
discourses. 
 
The third key epistemological choice highlighted above concerns the conceptualization of humans 
and their relation to discourse. At one end of the spectrum, theorists here imagine rather passive subjects 
who are—to a considerable extent—bound to act according to discursive structures (poststructuralist 
discourse theorists tend toward this stance; e.g., Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Torfing, 2005). At the other end 
of the spectrum, theorists envision rather self-reflexive individuals with a high degree of freedom to 
choose which discourses to follow—and which to resist. Hall (1973), for instance, grants humans the 
ability to “decode” hegemonic media discourses from oppositional positions. In a similar vein, Dryzek 
(2013) stresses that an “individual may sometimes have to think long and hard” which environmental 
discourse to subscribe to when different “discourses pull in different directions” (p. 22). Rooted in the 
adjacent discipline of anthropology, Yurchak (2003) vividly illustrates how “Soviet people . . . creatively 
reinterpreted the meanings of the ideological symbols . . . rendering communist values meaningful on 
their own terms” in complex ways that could not easily be “reduced to resistance, opportunism, or 
dissimulation” (p. 504). Whichever of these epistemological frameworks discourse researchers decide to 
adopt, I recommend approaching the issue of whether subjects unconsciously follow—or thoughtfully 
resist—a given media-politics discourse as an empirical question rather than an epistemological premise. 
 
Finally, I will point out two premises that all macro approaches to discourse share. These are (a) 
that discourses matter, that they have consequences that loom large in political life; and (b) that 
discourses inevitably reflect unequal power relations. As, for instance, Dryzek (2013) put it, discourses 
“embody power in the way they condition the perceptions and values of those subject to them” (p. 10). In 
this article I cannot discuss in detail each of the toolboxes developed by different theorists of macro 
discourses, grounded in their specific epistemological choices. My central claim, however, is that, by 
drawing on one of these approaches, comparative research that investigates distinct meaning systems as 
these underlie media landscapes across the globe can—and should—be reinvigorated. 
 
An Illustrative Case Study: The Dominant Media-Politics Discourse in Russia 
 
The goal of the case study presented here is to illustrate how the discourse approach developed 
above can be adopted in empirical research. To do so, the case study sketches the contours of the 
dominant media-politics discourse in Russia at the turn of the years 2012/2013. This specific focus was 
selected because Russia in the early 2010s represented a high-profile instance of what political scientists 
widely referred to as a novel type of hybrid political regime, which had arguably only proliferated since the 
end of the Cold War and combined elements of both democratic and authoritarian rule (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). 
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Method 
 
The case study reconstructs the media-politics discourse as propagated on the country’s leading 
First [TV] Channel in its main news program Vremya. At the time of this research, media experts typically 
considered First Channel a straightforward mouthpiece of Russia’s ruling elites (Lipman, 2009; Oates, 
2006, 2007). Weekly strategy meetings of leading editors and Kremlin staff were reported. In between 
these meetings, news coverage was obviously fine-tuned via phone calls (Lipman, 2009). The news 
reporting line of First Channel was broadly followed by the country’s other two leading state-controlled TV 
channels, NTV and Rossiya 1, which maintained similarly close ties with the Kremlin (Lipman, 2009; 
Mickiewicz, 2008; Oates, 2006, 2007; Roudakova, 2009). 
 
The news content disseminated by these firmly state-controlled TV channels was processed by 
citizens in extraordinarily complex ways, as revealed in extensive focus group research conducted with 
Russian TV viewers in the 2000s (Mickiewicz, 2008; Oates, 2006). Mickiewicz (2008), for instance, 
concluded, grounding her focus group study in an analytical framework from cognitive psychology, that 
Russian TV viewers had mastered an enormous supply of “mental shortcuts” that allowed them, even in 
the absence of viewpoint diversity, to develop a profound “sense of what is really happening” (p. 178). 
 
Such complex audience-content interactions notwithstanding, 87% of Russians still stated in a 
2011 survey that TV was their main source of news, with 71% saying they trusted TV more than all other 
types of media (Fond Obshchestvennoye Mneniye, 2011). Among those who trusted TV the most, 57% 
said they usually followed news on First Channel, 49% on Rossiya 1, 34% on NTV, 11% on local channels, 
and 9% on Rossiya 2. Against this backdrop and within a discourse paradigm, the media-politics discourse 
disseminated by Russia’s First Channel must thus be clearly considered as the core of the dominant 
media-politics discourse within Russia. At the time of this research, it was dominant in the sense that the 
overwhelming majority of the members of the political community were following it and were thus at least 
familiar with its basic structures. Undoubtedly, this discourse conveyed that repertoire of dominant 
meanings, which citizens could then react to by “subscribing to,” “resisting,” “creatively reinterpreting,” or 
“decoding” this dominant discourse from different perspectives (Dryzek, 2013; Hall, 1973; Yurchak, 
2003). 
 
The analysis presented here focuses exclusively on the one-year period between April 2012 and 
March 2013. This time period begins after the Russian parliament and the Russian president had been 
elected in December 2011 and March 2012, respectively—elections that were accompanied by major 
protests—and ends shortly before the tightening of the political climate that followed the 2013 Euromaidan 
protests in Kiev. The case study considers all news items broadcast on First Channel’s main news program 
Vremya within this one-year period. Transcripts of these items were readily available from the academic 
database Integrum. For the 12-month period in question, this database contains transcripts of 22,083 
Vremya news broadcasts. Each broadcast is dedicated to a specific topic and is typically between 30 
seconds and 8 minutes in length. 
 
Siebert et al. (1956/1973) developed their classic Four Theories by analyzing the text of key 
thinkers along four deductively generated categories: “[1] the nature of man, [2] the nature of society 
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and the state, [3] the relation of man to the state, and [4] the nature of knowledge and truth” (p. 2). 
These categories may have been, as criticized by Nerone (1995), “the wrong constitutive questions,” since 
they did not address important aspects such as the relationship between the media, economic structures, 
and political movements; the relationship between individual and group rights; and the question of 
whether freedom of expression is “about truth” or “about power” (p. 181). Adopting these four categories, 
the Four Theories may have, as Nerone (1995) argued, “necessarily” resulted in a “schema that pivoted 
on liberal terms” (p. 181). 
 
A simple way to avoid such Western bias in research pursued within a discourse approach would 
be to develop alternative categories, in an inductive manner, from the material—that is, by adopting an 
approach loosely structured around key principles of grounded theory (Glaser, 1992). However, doing so 
would limit the comparability of the findings with those of previous and future studies, because each study 
would portray media-politics discourses according to fundamentally different categories. Therefore, I 
illustrate a different approach in this case study. I suggest working with a partly deductively generated, 
slightly de-Westernized modification of the original four categories of Siebert et al. (1956/1973). To be 
more specific, I analyze the dominant media-politics discourse in Russia’s hybrid regime in terms of how it 
envisages (1) the members of society, (2) society as a whole and its political system, (3) the relationship 
between the political power center and members of society, (4) the problem of political decision making, 
and (5) the role of the Internet and the mass media within this framework of thinking. By comparison with 
the classic Four Theories, I refrain from using terms such as individual, man, and state, which are 
arguably more deeply rooted in Western culture. To be sure, future studies in a discourse paradigm can 
easily modify these five categories or adopt a grounded theory approach to increase the cultural 
sensitivity of their analysis (Glaser, 1992; Kim, 2007). 
 
In the process of data analysis, I aimed to achieve theoretical saturation of the findings with 
regard to each of these five predefined categories (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; see also Glaser, 1992). To work 
toward this goal, I began the process of data analysis by conducting a series of keyword searches in the 
database of transcripts. Initially, I used search terms that I deemed closely related to the relationship 
between the media and politics: freedom of the press (svoboda pressy, 2 items found), freedom of 
expression (svoboda slova, 35 items), censorship (zensura, 18), democracy AND media (demokratiya AND 
smi, 4 items), authoritarian OR autocracy (avtoritarniy OR avtokratiya, 4 items), and dictatorship 
(diktatura, 20 items). The goal of these searches was not to explore the meaning attributed to each 
keyword. Rather, this procedure was deployed to create an initial corpus of texts that conceptualized the 
relationship between media and politics in Russia (criterion sampling) and that contained the full variety of 
meanings on this issue as these were present within the discourse (maximum variation sampling; see 
Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). 
 
After reading and rereading this initial corpus of texts, I identified additional relevant news items 
by conducting additional keyword searches using terms that appeared to be of specific relevance to the 
relationship between the media and politics in this discourse (theoretical sampling; see Glaser, 1992). 
Additional keywords searched for included feedback (obratnaya svyaz’, a standard term used in the 
broadcasts for citizen input to the political system, 31 items), media AND open government (smi AND 
otkrytoye pravitel’stvo, a government initiative directed at improving governance by encouraging citizen 
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feedback, 4 items), and public television (within the period of analysis, the creation of a “public” TV 
channel was initiated by the Russian leadership, obshchestvennoye televideniye, 20 items). I stopped the 
process of enlarging the text corpus when I considered my findings with regard to the five categories to be 
theoretically saturated (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011)—that is, when additional items selected for analysis would 
add little to the refinement of the narratives I had developed so far. I reached this point after I had 
considered—that is, repeatedly read and reread—about 200 systematically selected news broadcasts. 
 
The Nature of Members of Society 
 
Within the discourse analyzed, members of Russian society are typically referred to as either 
grazhdane (citizens) or narod, a term that can be translated as either “the people” or “the nation” (First 
Channel, 2012a). Although narod referred in pre-Soviet times to “uneducated, uncultured, simple people” 
and in Soviet times to “subjects of a civilizing mission” (Rajagopalan, 2013, p. 52), the term is clearly 
embedded in this discourse with a different meaning. The discourse clearly conceives of the political will of 
ordinary citizens as the principal source of legitimacy of the regime, with the latter being unambiguously 
referred to as a democracy. These ideas are conveyed, for instance, in the following excerpt from a news 
broadcast transmitting a speech made by President Vladimir Putin in front of members of the Russian 
parliament: 
 
Dear Colleagues! For Russia, there is, and can be, no other political choice but 
democracy. . . . Yet, Russian democracy is notably the rule of the Russian people 
[narod] with its specific traditions of national self-governance. . . . Democracy means 
not only the opportunity to elect those in power, but also to constantly control those in 
power, to evaluate the results of their work. (First Channel, 2012a) 
 
As the last sentence of this quote indicates, Russian citizens are considered in the discourse to be 
endowed with a range of economic and political rights. These include the right to vote and the right to 
control the powers-that-be. In addition, Russian citizens are entitled to receive high-quality government 
services and—notably in this context—the right to free access to information (dostup k informatsii) and 
freedom of opinion (svoboda slova). Conversely, Russian citizens also have duties—to provide input, 
expert knowledge, and advice to government. Such input is widely referred to as citizen feedback 
(obratnaya svyaz’). To illustrate these discursive patterns, consider the following excerpt from a broadcast 
entitled “Citizens Must Have Real Opportunities to Control the Quality of Services of Public Bodies”: 
 
Voiceover: Russian citizens must have the maximum of full access to information about 
public bodies and the services that they provide. . . . 
Medvedev: Citizen feedback [obratnaya svyaz’], monitoring, public control, and ratings—
all these mechanisms allow us to identify the best institutions, both in the medical as 
well as in the education sector. (First Channel, 2013a) 
 
However, the media-politics discourse not only transports normative ideals of how Russian 
citizens should be, it also circulates a portrayal of how contemporary Russian citizens actually are. This 
portrayal is deeply ambivalent: At some points, citizens are pictured as highly capable, educated, and 
1538  Florian Toepfl International Journal of Communication 10(2016) 
rational (see, for instance, the quotes of Medvedev and Putin above). At other points, they are portrayed 
as uncivilized, emotional, and vulnerable. At the most abstract level, the assumption is that the Russian 
citizenry as a whole is (still) not as well educated or civilized as that of Western democracies. Most 
importantly, for the time being, some citizens can easily be misled by provocateurs—for example, right-
wing activists, nationalists, or agents of foreign powers: 
 
Putin: The constitutional right to freedom of opinion is untouchable. . . . Yet, no one has 
the right to sow hatred, stir up society . . . and thereby threaten the life, the welfare, 
and peace of millions of our citizens. . . . This holds particularly true for organizations 
who are steered and financed from abroad. (First Channel, 2013b) 
 
The Nature of Society and the Political System 
 
In the discourse, the history of Russian society is constructed as perpetually oscillating between 
times of ineffectiveness/stagnation (zastoy) and times of anarchy/chaos (khaos; see, e.g., First Channel, 
2012c). In past centuries, only the most capable Russian leaders are seen as having managed to balance 
these two forces and keep Russia on the golden middle path of stability (stabil’nost’). Most recently, the 
1990s, as the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, is cast as a time of democratic chaos. 
President Vladimir Putin is viewed as having managed in the 2000s to stabilize Russia again, ushering in a 
period of relative prosperity. By the end of the 2000s, however, the first signs of stagnation were visible in 
Russian society. Hence, political competition again needed to be carefully unleashed and democracy 
reinvigorated. The gist of this narrative is formulated in the following extract of a speech by President 
Medvedev, transmitted by First Channel (2012c): 
 
Medvedev: In 2004, . . . the direct elections of governors were abolished. In that phase, 
those were absolutely justified measures. The unstable political system which we 
inherited from the anarchy and oligarchy of the 1990s needed readjustment and 
enhancement. . . . But, as it always is, according to philosophical laws, after a period of 
stabilization of the system, signs of stagnation appeared. . . . I am sure that, at this 
point in our history, political diversity . . . will not lead to the return of chaos but, on the 
contrary, will make our state stronger, and also more effective. 
 
Yet, for the time being, Russian society is still clearly different from that of Western states, with 
the latter being typically referred to as “developed countries” (razvityye strany). Interestingly, Russian 
society is not described in the discourse as underdeveloped or undeveloped, but simply with no adjective. 
It is portrayed as (still) in flux and needing to follow a path of modernization (modernizatsiya). In a 
similar vein, Russian democracy is viewed as (still) by no means perfect, as needing to be developed, but 
without Russian society falling too far toward one of the two dangerous extremes of stagnation or chaos, 
carefully navigating the prosperous middle path of stability. 
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The Relationship Between Political Elites and Members of Society 
 
Russia’s political elites are typically cast in the discourse as servants of citizens, with a duty to 
govern openly and effectively in order to provide citizens with high-quality services. Specifically, the 
discourse carves out a clear qualitative difference between two types of political elites: (1) the highest 
echelons—most importantly, President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and a few close 
allies; and (2) all lower-level officials. Typically, political conflict is reported as occurring between the 
highest levels of political elites (portrayed as advocates of citizens’ interests) on the one side and lower-
level officials on the other. This pattern of conflict is institutionalized to such a degree that it has morphed 
into a standard news format in the news program Vremya. In this common format, Vladimir Putin 
(sometimes assisted by representatives of civil society) harshly questions a lower-level official, such as a 
regional governor. The lower-level officials usually promise, rather submissively, to improve their 
performance for the good of the citizens. 
 
This format can be illustrated with a newscast that aired on September 4, 2012 (First Channel, 
2012b). In this news item, President Putin tells off the governor of the Mari El Republic, Leonid Markelov. 
As the voiceover notes, this meeting is being held in the “traditional format, with participation of 
representatives of society” (First Channel, 2012b). A local doctor, Anna Demina, complains to the 
president about delays in the reconstruction of a local medical policlinic. Governor Markelov explains that 
the project is already under way. Yet President Putin is dissatisfied with the governor’s efforts. To speed 
up the undertaking, he briskly draws up a different way of raising and structuring the necessary loans: 
 
Putin: There are different variants. Give me a sheet of paper. I will issue the 
corresponding orders to the Ministries of Finance and Health. Just keep in mind that you 
need to finish the building, and that it will collapse if it is left standing around unfinished. 
(First Channel, 2012b) 
 
It is not only lower-level officials who need to work more efficiently to improve the political and 
economic situation in the country. Ordinary citizens also have to contribute. First, they need to provide 
vibrant feedback to their rulers (see previous section). Second, they must be empowered to monitor and 
control the performance of lower-level officials, with transparency (prozrachnost’; First Channel, 2012c) 
being the technical term promoted here. Third, citizens are entitled to select their political leaders in 
regular, free, and fair elections (see quotes above). 
 
The Nature of Political Decision Making 
 
Within the discourse, political decision making is widely understood as a merely technical and 
administrative issue. If authorities work efficiently and transparently, and if all relevant information is 
available to them, they are capable of identifying the best decisions to further the common good. This 
fundamental approach is, to cite but one example here, explicitly formulated in the following statement by 
Putin: “I am speaking here to the heads of our federal states. . . . You need to work with people. You need 
to work every day. You need to plan this work, and you need to do it effectively” (First Channel, 2012a). 
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Thus, in the Russian discourse, political decision making is not cast—as it frequently is in Western 
democracies—as a matter of balancing competing social forces or finding compromises between social 
groups with competing interests. Neither is political decision making portrayed as a matter of agreeing 
upon an—inherently controversial—distribution of scarce public goods. By contrast, political decisions 
emerge exclusively as a result of the efficient work of officials, in close cooperation with citizens. Within 
this framework, neither citizens’ right to freedom of opinion (svoboda slova), nor their right to participate 
in opposition movements are cast as able to increase the quality of decision making. 
 
The Role of Internet-Mediated Communication and the Mass Media 
 
By contrast, Internet-mediated communication between political elites and individual citizens is 
very much welcomed in the discourse. The Internet is seen as an excellent tool for citizens to provide 
feedback, to “participate more directly in government,” and to monitor officials (First Channel, 2012d). To 
fulfil these tasks, the Internet needs to be a free, uncensored communicative space. Any limitation on this 
free space needs to be justified with reference to competing values, such as curbing child pornography, 
terrorism, intergroup violence, or the dissemination of extremist ideas. 
 
With regard to the role of the mass media, the discourse circulates a complex set of ideas. A first 
task of the mass media is to facilitate diversity of opinion. In the period analyzed, Russia’s ruling elites 
even initiated the creation of a “public” television channel—an endeavor that was covered in 20 news 
items. This channel was founded to increase diversity of opinion—that is, to foster a dialogue between 
citizens and the state—and facilitate political competition to thwart stagnation. Hovering above all political 
competition, however, are the highest echelons of Russia’s political elites. This discursive configuration is 
most visibly institutionalized in the newly founded public TV channel, whose editor-in-chief is—despite all 
claims to diversity—appointed by the president. A second goal of the mass media is to socialize and 
educate citizens. This is what, in Soviet discourse, would have been referred to—with a positive 
connotation—as propaganda. However, the term in this positive meaning has disappeared from the 
dominant media-politics discourse. 
 
While the discourse thus draws widely on a vocabulary that is common also in dominant media-
politics discourses in Western democracies (e.g., diversity of opinion, free access to information, 
democracy), it is instructive to point out concepts that are notably absent. First, the concepts of media 
freedom (svoboda smi) and press freedom (svoboda pressy) are eschewed. Of 22,083 news items, only 
two contain the keyword press freedom, and these are reports on the French satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo publishing cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. The absence of these concepts is all the 
more notable since alone 18 stories within the period analyzed discuss the creation of the new public TV 
channel. However, although the new channel is expected to report independently, to reflect a diversity of 
views, and to facilitate a vibrant dialogue between citizens and state, it is not expected to be free. 
 
Other common Western concepts and metaphors absent from the media-politics discourse include 
the idea that the media can or should control political power; metaphors similar to that of the media as a 
watchdog, a fourth estate, or a free market of ideas; and the idea that public debate (let alone 
deliberation) in the media could be helpful in generating solutions to social problems. Furthermore, unlike 
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in Western media-politics discourses, private ownership of the mass media is not linked to a positive 
notion of media independence; on the contrary, it emerges as a highly problematic threat to independent 
reporting. Private ownership is widely seen as resulting in the instrumentalization of the mass media by 
rich individuals with low moral standards (oligarchs). Conversely, media controlled by the highest political 
elites, such as the new public TV channel, are cast as independent in the sense that they are not 




Russian Rationales: Libertarian Vocabulary, Authoritarian Meanings 
 
The case study presented here reveals, first, a discourse that heavily draws on a vocabulary 
similar to that of media-politics discourses in many contemporary Western democracies. Cases in point are 
widely used terms such as democracy, media independence, and free access to information. Second, 
however, the analysis also provides evidence of how these libertarian terms emerge in the Russian 
discourse with fundamentally different meanings. For instance, whereas in Western discourses, media 
independence is typically seen as being achieved by means of private media ownership, it is cast in 
Russian discourse as being guaranteed by the highest echelons of political elites. This very specific 
meaning of media independence can only be properly understood within the horizon of the entire media-
politics discourse—that is, within the nexus of meaningful terms that the Russian discourse draws up. In 
other words, the meaning of media independence cannot be expressed without also introducing specific 
notions of private ownership, democracy, citizen feedback, and political decision making. This necessity 
illustrates one of the premises of the discourse approach proposed in this article, which is that meaning is 
contingent and emerges only in relational accounts within the discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan & 
Dahlberg, 2011). 
 
Third, the findings reveal how the Russian media-politics discourse eschews several concepts that 
are central to libertarian discourses, such as press freedom or the media’s role in controlling government. 
Fourth, the analysis shows how the Russian discourse creates a series of alternative concepts and 
metaphors that appear to be unique to this discourse. These concepts are neither found in the classic Four 
Theories (Siebert et al., 1956/1973), nor do they appear to loom large in media-politics discourses in 
contemporary Western democracies. Examples include the idea of press regulation as a matter of 
balancing the two societal threats of stagnation and chaos and the specific concept of citizen feedback. 
Fifth, it is obvious from the analysis that Russian media-politics discourse has broken with its Soviet 
legacy. Completely absent were key terms of Soviet media discourse such as communism and class 
struggle (see also the account by Siebert et al. (1956/1973) of the “Soviet model”). Other common Soviet 
terms such as propaganda and narod emerge with fundamentally different meanings in the discourse 
analyzed here. 
 
To summarize, Russian discourse partly adopts a libertarian vocabulary that emerges with 
meanings that Western observers would “deconstruct” (Hall, 1973) as authoritarian. However, this does 
not mean that the logic of the Russian discourse as such is contradictory. By contrast, it draws up a 
complex, highly coherent nexus of meaning. Within this logically coherent discourse, many of the 
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seemingly paradoxical media practices that can be observed in contemporary Russia make perfect sense. I 
explain this below by reinterpreting the three paradoxes cited in the introduction. 
 
The Relevance of Discourse: Resolving Paradoxes 
 
To recall, the first paradox was that the Kremlin owns the most powerful opposition radio station. 
This policy makes sense within the discourse outlined above. First of all, Echo Moscow can be seen as a 
valuable channel for citizen feedback. Second, shutting down or censoring the station or its Internet site 
would severely curb the strongly emphasized rights of citizens to free access to information and to the 
Internet as a free communicative space. Third, Echo Moscow can be seen as contributing to diversity of 
opinion within the Russian media landscape. There is an urgent need for a specific type of political 
competition to be upheld, since Russian society at the time of this research was threatened with falling 
into stagnation. Fourth, however, the extent and shape of this political competition can be fine-tuned by 
the Kremlin through its property rights. In times of street protest or heightened political instability, for 
instance, the composition of the editorial team of Echo Moscow can be easily reshuffled to prevent Russian 
society from plunging into chaos. On the basis of a similar rationale, it makes complete sense for Russian 
political elites to control one of the country’s leading blogging platforms, LiveJournal, but to allow the 
blogs of opposition figures to operate freely on it (paradox 2). 
 
Critics may object at this point that the discourse on state-controlled TV does not reflect the true 
beliefs of the Russian leadership (see Yurchak, 2003). Yet, within a discourse approach, the true beliefs of 
actors are not considered of central importance. Rather, as Schmidt (2008) argued from a political science 
perspective, discourses can be likened to “institutions”: They not only commit “the speakers themselves to 
action” but also constrain “the ideas, discourse, and actions of their successors” (p. 312; see also 
Christians et al., 2009). In line with this understanding, Schmidt (2008) demonstrated in a case study 
how contemporary French political leaders were constrained in their policies toward the European Union by 
discursive patterns introduced by their predecessors—in particular, by de Gaulle’s initial ideas legitimating 
European integration. Similarly, we can assume that some particularly deeply entrenched elements of the 
Russian media-politics discourse (i.e., that have been reproduced over long periods of time on state-
controlled TV) may, to a certain degree, even constrain the policies of the country’s current and future 
leadership. 
 
This latter claim is certainly provocative. Of course, on a day-to-day basis, the reporting from 
Russia’s First Channel must be considered as meticulously directed by the country’s ruling elites. As noted 
earlier, First Channel’s coverage is even constantly fine-tuned via phone calls from the Kremlin. Yet, at a 
deeper level, even for the Russian leadership, introducing fundamental changes to the discourse may be 
associated with negative consequences. For instance, Russia’s elites will most likely be hesitant to 
explicitly abolish cornerstones of the hegemonic discourse, such as the guarantee of political competition, 
elections, democracy, or free access to information. Crossing these limits would, most likely, irritate 
citizens who operate within the hegemonic discourse as well as considerably damage those citizens’ belief 
in the legitimacy of the current regime. Against this backdrop, it could be argued, for instance, that the 
introduction of a Chinese-style censorship policy is an unlikely scenario for Russia’s near future, because 
its introduction would irritate ordinary Russian citizens. For more than a decade, the right to free access to 
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information has been a highly visible and firmly entrenched element of Russia’s hegemonic media-politics 
discourse. 
 
This type of reasoning highlights one of the key analytical strengths of discourse research: It can 
generate a deeper understanding of how individuals operating within distinct media-politics discourses 
make sense of their media-related behavior and of which paths of action appear appropriate to these 
individuals and why. For instance, discourse research can help scholars to understand why some type of 
media-related event or policy will outrage individuals operating within a specific discourse and why others 
will not. Along these lines, even though not explicitly grounding her study in a discourse paradigm, 
Roudakova (2009), for instance, has pointed to the “widespread discourse of journalism as ‘prostitution’” 
(p. 424) in Russia in the 2000s as one explanation for the “delayed, lukewarm, or nonexistent” (p. 412) 
reaction of citizens, journalists, and officials to the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006. 
 
Consider, as another illustrative example, the third paradox highlighted in the introduction. It, 
too, disappears within the logic of the hegemonic Russian media-politics discourse sketched above. How 
can Russian citizens trust state-controlled TV even though they do not believe in its independence? 
Russian citizens subscribing to the dominant media-politics discourse may be fully aware that their leading 
TV channels are tightly controlled by the highest political elites. However, they may trust media outlets 
that are dependent on their highly respected political leader (Vladimir Putin) more than those that are 
dependent on shady private owners (oligarchs). They may also value highly the role of state-controlled 
media in stabilizing their country and averting chaos. 
 
Here, again, critics may object that few Russians take the official discourse at face value—that is, 
to speak in the terms of Hall’s (1973) classic encoding/decoding model, few decode the hegemonic media-
politics discourse from the perspective of the encoders (the Russian leadership). And yet a recent 
explorative study drawing on Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding approach revealed that, even among 
young, urban, and educated Russians, many decoded the official discourses propagated on state television 
affirmatively, largely following the meanings as intended by Russia’s ruling elites (Toepfl, 2013). In 
addition, a range of survey data containing seemingly paradoxical findings, such as the ones quoted 
above, can scarcely be explained without taking into account the fact that large swathes of the Russian 




The discourse approach delineated in this article should not be read as a general critique of 
existing approaches to comparative media research. Discourse research is conceived here not as a 
substitute for, but rather as a complement to, other traditions. Its central added value may be, as Torfing 
(2005) put it, that it “poses other kinds of research questions than those generated by behaviorist, 
institutionalist, and rational choice perspectives” (p. 22). Most importantly, it rejects the taking of 
pregiven social structures or interests as starting points for an analysis, presupposing that these 
structures need to be understood and explained by the analyst (Phelan & Dahlberg, 2011). Knowledge 
produced in discourse research is therefore often considered an indispensable basis and backdrop for 
other types of empirical research (Dryzek, 2013; Torfing, 2005). The case study presented in this article, 
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for instance, illustrates how key terms in media politics, such as independence and freedom of opinion, 
emerge with fundamentally different meanings in dominant Russian discourse. Consequently, it will 
scarcely be possible to design, let alone interpret, a media-related survey of citizens or journalists in this 
cultural context without a well-founded awareness of how respondents may—or may not—understand 
survey items constructed around these keywords. Similarly, as the paradoxes cited at the beginning of 
this article illustrate, the media policies of Russian leaders may be difficult to comprehend for observers 
who are not familiar with the nexus of meanings within which Russian leaders “construct, interpret, 
discuss, and analyze” problems (Dryzek, 2013, p. 11). 
 
Although this article puts forward a largely theoretical argument based on one illustrative case 
study, it opens up at least four promising avenues for future research. First, the case study of the 
dominant media-politics discourse in Russia presented here could be extended, tracing changes over time 
from the Soviet Union of the 1980s to the tightening of the political climate that followed the Russian 
expansion into the Crimea in 2014. Second, an extended analysis could map counterdiscourses on Russian 
media and politics, both within and outside Russia, as disseminated by opposition groups, the Russian 
media, or international human rights organizations. Third, future research could investigate the complex 
ways by which, and the degree to which, Russian citizens, journalists, and political elites “subscribe to” 
(Dryzek, 2013), “decode” (Hall, 1973), or “creatively reinterpret” (Yurchak, 2003) these various media-
politics discourses in making sense of their media-related practices. Fourth, and perhaps most crucially, 
these various types of discourse research could be adopted in comparative studies. Researchers could, for 
instance, juxtapose dominant media-politics discourses within different (semi)authoritarian regimes such 
as those of China, Venezuela, or Iran. By embarking on these and related paths of research, a discourse 
approach could thus reinvigorate comparative research on the distinct meaning systems underpinning 
media landscapes across the globe. And, as I have argued here, it could thus regenerate a currently 
marginalized type of knowledge that is, particularly in times of a global “authoritarian resurgence” 
(Walker, 2015), vital to any in-depth understanding of media-related practices of citizens, journalists, and 
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